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RECONCILING  CONGRESS  TO  TAX  REFORM
Rebecca M. Kysar*
Tax law constantly churns, somehow avoiding the molasses of the legislative process.  A
common critique levied against tax law is that there is too much legislative action, resulting in
ever-changing rules.  This Essay argues that, in reality, congressional gridlock, the theme of the
symposium for which this piece is written, is ever-present in the tax context.  Although Congress
increasingly enacts a high volume of temporary, patchwork tax provisions, it fails to accomplish
fundamental tax reform, which is a necessary part of any solution to the looming budgetary
crisis.  As a result, recent proposals to enact tax reform through an existing fast-track framework,
the reconciliation process, or through an entirely new process aimed specifically at tax reform,
have gained popularity.
Despite the growing flexibility of existing fast-track processes, however, their truncated time-
lines and production of polarizing, unstable policies are antithetical to fundamental tax reform.
A simple majority’s ability to shape such processes to its ends also threatens the precarious Senate
truce over the filibuster.  From an institutional perspective, this nontransparent, piecemeal
approach to filibuster reform destabilizes Senate practices and contributes to partisan politics that
make the achievement of tax reform and other policies even more remote.  For these reasons,
existing fast-track processes should primarily be relegated to meeting annual deficit targets once
tax reform is achieved.  Learning from the undesirable features of these processes, this Essay
proposes a set of framework procedures that have the potential to assist Congress in achieving
fundamental tax reform over the next two years.  In the near-term, a commitment to such a
process may also help bridge impasses over future budgetary and fiscal conflicts.
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INTRODUCTION
Congressional gridlock, the theme of this symposium, has long been a
part of American politics.1  Central features of constitutional design and the
legislative process, such as bicameralism and the filibuster, encourage it.  Yet
escalating partisanship and the heightened use of the filibuster, some argue,
has now crippled Congress, resulting in a new and troubling degree of politi-
cal stalemate.2
1 SARAH A. BINDER, STALEMATE: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF LEGISLATIVE GRIDLOCK
1 (2003) (“Gridlock is not a modern legislative condition.  Although the term is said to
have entered the American political lexicon after the 1980 elections, Alexander Hamilton
complained more than two centuries ago about stalemate, at the time rooted in the design
of the Continental Congress.  In the very first Federalist, Hamilton bemoaned the ‘unequiv-
ocal experience of the inefficacy of the subsisting federal government’ . . . .”).
2 In 2011, our political system, plagued by irreconcilability over issues necessary to
staving off a fiscal crisis, ground to a halt.  The brinksmanship resulted in the credit rating
for American bonds being downgraded for the first time in history and volatility in the
markets. United States of America Long-Term Rating Lowered to ‘AA+’ Due to Political Risks,
Rising Debt Burden; Outlook Negative, STANDARD & POOR’S (Aug. 5, 2011), http://www.standar-
dandpoors.com/ratings/articles/en/us/?assetID=1245316529563 (citing the failure of the 2011
debt ceiling agreement to stabilize “medium-term debt dynamics” and the “view that the
effectiveness, stability, and predictability of American policymaking and political institu-
tions have weakened at a time of ongoing fiscal and economic challenges” as contributing
factors to the downgrade).  Congress’s inertia continues to threaten budgetary catastro-
phe.  Although an agreement to increase the debt-ceiling between the President and the
leaders of congressional parties was eventually reached, thus avoiding immediate default,
the solution was temporary.  The Budget Control Act of 2011 left the debt reduction
details to be ironed out by a special joint committee, referred to as the supercommittee.
Budget Control Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-25, 125 Stat. 239.  Because the supercommit-
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Tax law, on the other hand, constantly churns, somehow avoiding the
molasses of the legislative process.3  A common critique levied against tax law
is that there is too much legislative action, resulting in ever-changing rules.
This Essay argues that, in reality, gridlock is ever-present in the tax context.
Although Congress increasingly enacts a high volume of temporary, patch-
work tax provisions, it fails to accomplish fundamental tax reform, which is a
necessary part of any solution to the looming budgetary crisis.4  Simply put,
there is too much of the wrong kind of tax legislative action.  Counter-intui-
tively, congressional gridlock can exist in an area of high legislative activity.
Recent proposals to enact tax reform through an existing fast-track
framework, the reconciliation process, or through an entirely new process
aimed specifically at tax reform, have gained popularity.5  Reconciliation
began as a modest tool that would align autumn legislation with revenue and
spending targets that had been adjusted from the spring budget resolution.6
tee did not reach an agreement to produce debt reduction legislation within the time
limits imposed in the Budget Control Act, in early 2013 the government faced the legisla-
tively imposed consequences—sequestration, or automatic, across-the-board cuts in the
amount of $1.2 trillion of spending programs.  Of even greater concern are mounting
budget deficits, which raise the specter of further economic downturns and risk of unprec-
edented fiscal and budgetary crises.
3 This phenomenon has been noted in the literature. See, e.g., Richard L. Doernberg
& Fred S. McChesney, On the Accelerating Rate and Decreasing Durability of Tax Reform, 71
MINN. L. REV. 913, 952–53 (1987) (theorizing that increased tax legislation results from
congressional members’ desire to capture rents); Daniel Shaviro, Beyond Public Choice and
Public Interest: A Study of the Legislative Process as Illustrated by Tax Legislation in the 1980s, 139
U. PA. L. REV. 1, 3 (1990) (discussing the “perpetual income tax legislation” of the 1980s).
The widespread use of temporary legislation in the tax context in the last two decades has
further decreased the durability of tax legislation.  Rebecca M. Kysar, Lasting Legislation,
159 U. PA. L. REV. 1007, 1026–37 (2011) [hereinafter Kysar, Lasting Legislation]; Rebecca
M. Kysar, The Sun Also Rises: The Political Economy of Sunset Provisions in the Tax Code, 40 GA.
L. REV. 335, 337 (2006) [hereinafter Kysar, The Sun Also Rises].
4 See Peter Orszag, Op-Ed., One Nation, Two Deficits, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 6, 2010), http:/
/www.nytimes.com/2010/09/07/opinion/07orszag.html?pagewanted=all (“Although
hardly anyone wants to admit it, we’re not going to solve our budget problem over the next
decade unless revenue is part of the equation.”).
5 The Senate’s budget resolution for fiscal year 2014 contemplates tax reform
through the reconciliation process.  S. Con. Res. 8, 113th Cong. (Mar. 23, 2013); see also
Pathway to Job Creation Through a Simpler, Fairer Tax Code Act of 2012, H.R. 6169,
112th Cong. (passed by the House on August 2, 2012) (creating a special fast-track process
for tax reform); Sam Goldfarb, GOP Operatives Eye Special Tactics to Pass Tax Overhaul Under
a Romney Victory, CONG. Q. (Nov. 1, 2012), http://public.cq.com/docs/news/news-000004
171079.html (discussing the use of reconciliation to pass Romney’s tax reform plan); Erik
Wasson, Few Details on Senate Dem Budget Plan, THE HILL (Jan. 21, 2013), http://thehill.
com/blogs/on-the-money/budget/278275-dems-agree-to-do-budget-but-details-are-sketchy
(discussing Democrats’ plan to use the budget reconciliation process to “lift” tax reform);
Jonathan Weisman, Obama’s New Offer on Fiscal Crisis Could Lead to Deal, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 17,
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/18/us/politics/president-delivers-a-new-offer-
on-the-fiscal-crisis-to-boehner.html (discussing Obama’s proposal of “fast-track procedures”
to assist in reform of the individual and corporate tax code).
6 See infra notes 22–28 and accompanying discussion. R
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It quickly evolved, however, into a forceful method of enacting major policy
changes.  The benefits of utilizing fast-track processes like reconciliation are
obvious.  Because fast-track processes generally limit debate upon tax reform
legislation, they obviate the need to invoke cloture in the Senate, thus creat-
ing a simple majority regime in both houses.7  By lifting the filibuster or
offering quick time frames for consideration, fast-track processes have the
potential to help achieve tax reform for the first time in over a quarter of a
decade.  They will likely, however, fall short of this promise.
Reconciliation is increasingly flexible as a procedural matter in the tax
context.  Its intrinsic features, however, are not conducive to enacting ambi-
tious tax legislation.  Contrary to popular thought, fast-track processes pro-
duce dynamics that are antithetical to fundamental tax reform.  Majority
voting, reduced committee power, and a truncated timeline—features of
existing fast-track processes—engender fragile and narrow tax legislation
rather than complex, long-lasting tax reform.  Moreover, the contested
boundaries of such processes create further instability since lawmakers per-
ceive their products to be born from illegitimate means.  The constant threat
to undo recent reconciliation acts, such as healthcare reform and the Bush
tax cuts, exemplifies these phenomena.8
In addition to fast-track being a poor vehicle for tax reform, over-reli-
ance upon it has actually contributed to the dearth of tax reform in recent
decades.  This is because reconciliation creates polarized laws and, at times,
sunset provisions.  These unstable agreements demand constant attention
from Congress, allowing members to fulfill their duty to do something about
national tax policy even though they remain gridlocked regarding the funda-
mental trajectory of that policy.  Although legislative flexibility is appropriate
in some areas of tax law, a short-term, one-sided approach to resolving the
nation’s grave budgetary ills is unlikely to be curative.
Prior critiques of the reconciliation process in the tax context have
focused upon the process’s privileging of revenue concerns over traditional
7 Reconciliation removes the threat of the filibuster entirely.  A new proposed fast-
track process would remove cloture votes upon amendments and motions to proceed but
would maintain the possibility of a cloture vote on the final consideration of the bill. See
infra notes 82–88 and accompanying text. R
8 Although such instability may not pose problems for certain policy objectives, it is
undesirable when the objective is a decades-long plan towards fiscal sustainability.  For
instance, a short-term stimulus may be necessary to increase demand in a weak economy.
However, long-term fiscal discipline is necessary to reign in deficits. See, e.g., Robert E.
Rubin, Peter R. Orszag, & Allen Sinai, Sustained Budget Deficits: Longer-Run U.S. Economic
Performance and the Risk of Financial and Fiscal Disarray 11 (Jan. 4, 2004) (paper presented at
the AEA-NAEFA Joint Session, Allied Social Science Associations Annual Meetings, The
Andrew Brimmer Policy Forum, “National Economic and Financial Policies for Growth
and Stability”), available at http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/
2004/1/05budgetdeficit%20orszag/20040105.pdf.  This uncertainty also thwarts the goal
of signaling legislative commitment to budgetary responsibility at a level demanded by
investors.
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tax policy criteria.9  This Essay departs from that literature by assuming that
tax reform must address revenue concerns in light of the budget crisis; reve-
nue-neutral tax reform simply has no place in today’s policy landscape.  Yet
despite the ability of the reconciliation process to set revenue targets, it is not
the key to achieving revenue-increasing tax reform.  Instead, reconciliation
would be better harnessed to tweak revenues, on an annual basis, to the
desired level of the federal deficit or surplus once tax reform is achieved.
The congressional fight over the parameters of the reconciliation pro-
cess has increased strife between parties, making bipartisan agreement less
likely.  Current efforts to create a new fast-track process for tax reform will
likewise prove controversial.  In recent years, the scope of reconciliation has
become the subject of much controversy, expanding and contracting in
accordance with party preferences, particularly in the tax context.  This is
because a simple majority can alter budget-related Senate rules through the
budget resolution, which in turn is not subject to a filibuster.  Thus, when
Republicans are in charge, reconciliation can be used to enact tax cuts, but
once Democrats regain power, reconciliation can only be used for tax
increases.  When it comes to virtually all tax law, the filibuster has become
elective.
This procedural struggle over the scope of fast-track illuminates impor-
tant aspects of today’s legislative process.  Although, in the past, reconcilia-
tion has served as a release valve for the pressure of strict supermajority rule
in the Senate, its increasingly contested boundaries expose the fundamental
fragility of the filibuster.  A simple majority’s ability to decide the scope of the
reconciliation process in the tax area will have ramifications far beyond that
context by threatening the filibuster and the legitimacy of Senate rules gener-
ally.  Less reliance upon reconciliation in producing major tax legislation
may thus help to preserve the filibuster, or at least channel filibuster reform
through transparent, unified means, rather than the current covert, fragmen-
tary approach of reconciliation.
On a more hopeful note, learning from the undesirable features of fast-
track legislation, it is possible to design a set of framework procedures that do
have the potential to assist Congress in achieving fundamental tax reform.  In
the near-term, a commitment to such a process has the added benefit of
providing a way forward through budgetary and fiscal conflicts.  Although the
American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 partially resolved the fiscal cliff,10 the
threat of sequestration and the ongoing necessity of providing a federal
budget and raising the debt ceiling makes future stalemates inevitable.  Tax
9 See, e.g., Charles E. McLure, Jr., The Budget Process and Tax Simplification/Complica-
tion, 45 TAX L. REV. 25, 79 (1989) (arguing that the tax system is more complicated due to
reconciliation); Charles Tiefer, How to Steal a Trillion: The Uses of Laws About Lawmaking in
2001, 17 J.L. & POL. 409, 414, 455 (2001) (“[R]econciliation facilitated enormous and
skewed tax cuts . . . .”); Donald B. Tobin, Less is More: A Move Toward Sanity in the Budget
Process, 16 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 115, 128–31 (1996) (discussing how reconciliation has
changed the budget process).
10 American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-240, 126 Stat. 2313.
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reform is an essential part of any long-term deficit reduction plan, and thus
providing a process in which it can be achieved may pave the way for agree-
ment over these issues.
In Part I of this Essay, I discuss the history and rather remarkable rise of
the most well-known fast-track process, reconciliation, updating the extant
literature to include recent developments of that process.11  Despite reconcil-
iation’s potential application to almost any tax legislative context, in Part II, I
contend that its features are hostile to fundamental tax reform, conclusions
which can be extended to other fast-track processes.  In Part III of this Essay,
I caution against the overuse of fast-track processes, which may derail tax
reform efforts, instead suggesting that fast-track be primarily used to achieve
annual budgetary goals post-tax reform.  As an alternative, I propose a set of
framework procedures that are aimed to help achieve tax reform over a two-
year period and that avoid some of the pitfalls of existing fast-track processes.
In this Part, I also contend that a simple majority’s constant redefinition of
the scope of fast-track processes threatens the legitimacy of Senate rules gen-
erally, suggesting that filibuster reform would be better achieved through
more transparent and bipartisan means.
I. THE WAYWARD PATH OF RECONCILIATION
A. Background of the Budgetary Process: The Congressional Budget Act and the
Budget Resolution
The Congressional Budget Act of 1974 (the “Budget Act”) established
the congressional budget process, of which reconciliation began as a modest
part.12  The Budget Act created the use of the congressional budget resolu-
tion, which sets forth a budget of congressional policies for the fiscal year
and budget totals for the budget window period.13  Prior to the Budget Act,
11 On the spending side, Anita Krishnakumar has also explored significant shortcom-
ings in using the reconciliation process to produce budgetary reform.  Anita S.
Krishnakumar, Note, Reconciliation and the Fiscal Constitution: The Anatomy of the 1995–96
Budget “Train Wreck,” 35 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 589, 589 (1998). For general scholarly exami-
nations of the reconciliation process, see JOHN B. GILMOUR, RECONCILABLE DIFFERENCES?
93–138 (1990); Elizabeth Garrett, Rethinking the Structures of Decisionmaking in the Federal
Budget Process, 35 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 387 (1998); Philip G. Joyce & Robert D. Reischauer,
Deficit Budgeting: The Federal Budget Process and Budget Reform, 29 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 429
(1992); James A. Miller & James D. Range, Reconciling an Irreconcilable Budget: The New Polit-
ics of the Budget Process, 20 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 4 (1983); Tiefer, supra note 9.  For a historical
overview of the process, see ALLEN SCHICK, THE FEDERAL BUDGET 142–49 (3d ed. 2007) and
Allen Schick, A History of Reconciliation, 49 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 116 (1993).
12 Congressional Budget Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-344, 88 Stat. 297.
13 The budget window is the period of time covered by the budget resolution.  The
budget resolution is required to cover at a minimum five fiscal years, beginning with the
fiscal year in the session that the resolution is adopted (the “budget year”).  Historically,
the period has covered up to eleven years, starting with the year preceding the budget year.
ROBERT KEITH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30862, THE BUDGET RECONCILIATION PROCESS:
THE SENATE’S “BYRD RULE” 2 (2010), available at http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/
RL30862_20100702.pdf.
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Congress operated on budget-related measures in piecemeal fashion, relying
on the President’s budget as a coordination device.  Wishing to wrest control
from the President after political conflicts regarding the executive’s
impoundment power, Congress initiated the budget resolution to set cohe-
sive, independent budgetary policy.14  Although the President still enjoys the
first-mover advantages of setting his budget priorities at the beginning of the
year, the congressional budget resolution offers a more efficient mechanism
for Congress to respond in a unified manner (as opposed to proposing thir-
teen individual annual appropriations bills).
Along with optional reconciliation instructions, the budget resolution
usually includes budget aggregates (revenues, debt, spending-budget author-
ity and outlays, and deficit/surplus) and functional allocations (for sectors of
the budget such as defense and agriculture), changes in House or Senate
procedural rules governing the budgetary process, and other nonbinding
sentiments.15  The advisory nature of the budget resolution was designed to
allow Congress to maintain its traditionally decentralized revenue and spend-
ing decisions across existing committees through the lawmaking function.
To assist Congress in meeting the targets in the budget resolution, the
Budget Act also created the Congressional Budget Office (the “CBO”), which
is a nonpartisan agency within the legislative branch that provides cost esti-
mates for legislative proposals and values the budgetary effects of existing
legislation.
The Budget Act also formed the budget committees, which are responsi-
ble for drafting the resolution.16  Because the budget resolution essentially
sets forth the budget policy of Congress and encompasses most major legisla-
tion, the majority party leaders have largely controlled the budget commit-
tees.  This dynamic has shifted a great deal of power unto majority party
leaders since they essentially initiate the reconciliation process.  Indeed, the
reconciliation process is viewed as a contributing cause of the recent congres-
sional era of majoritarian politics, at the expense of committee power.17
Conflicts over the budget resolution have become “one of the most par-
tisan matters Congress takes up each year.”18  Moreover, because the budget
resolution carries no legal consequences, failure to enact it does not necessa-
rily derail substantive legislation.  It is thus not surprising that the process, at
times, breaks down.19  From fiscal years 1976–1998, Congress passed the
14 SCHICK, supra note 11, at 119–20.
15 Congressional Budget Act of 1974 § 301, 88 Stat. at 306–08 (codified as amended at
2 U.S.C. § 632); SCHICK, supra note 11, at 122–23.
16 Congressional Budget Act of 1974 § 301.
17 Elizabeth Garrett, The Congressional Budget Process: Strengthening the Party-in-Govern-
ment, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 702 (2000). Others have portrayed this shift as moving from a
committee-centered dynamic to a “floor-centered” one. GILMOUR, supra note 11, at 112,
135–37.
18 SCHICK, supra note 11, at 132.
19 Congressional rules limiting debate on the resolution, thereby foreclosing the possi-
bility of a filibuster, do ease the passage of the budget resolution. Id. at 138.  Nonetheless,
stalemate still occurs.
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budget resolution within a month or two of the April 15 deadline.20  For
fiscal year 1999, however, a Republican-controlled Congress warred with Pres-
ident Clinton over the spending of the surplus and failed to pass a resolution.
Several more recent Congresses have been deadlocked due to a very different
problem—disagreement over how to deal with an increasing deficit.21
B. The Origins of Reconciliation
The Budget Act originally commanded Congress to revise targets in a
second budget resolution just prior to the beginning of the fiscal year.22  The
reconciliation process was created as an optional procedure to help Congress
pass tax and entitlement legislation in order to meet these new targets, which
were binding (unlike those in the first resolution).23  Under the Budget Act,
the budget committees could write into this second resolution “reconcilia-
tion instructions” directing committees to draft such legislation to bring the
budget in line with the binding targets.24  If the legislation came from more
than one committee, the budget committees would package their “recom-
mendations” into one omnibus reconciliation bill.25  Otherwise, a committee
could directly report reconciliation legislation to the chamber without
involvement from the budget committees.26
In order to assist swift passage of legislation to meet the resolution’s
targets, reconciliation bills are not subject to filibusters or non-germane
amendments.27  Because of these expedited procedures, the importance of
the reconciliation process has risen dramatically.  Since its first use in 1980,
reconciliation has been used in most years, resulting in the passage of 23
reconciliation bills (three of which were vetoed).28
20 Id. at 123.
21 Congress did not complete action on budget resolutions for fiscal years 2003, 2005,
2007, 2011, 2012, and 2013. BILL HENIFF, JR. & JUSTIN MURRAY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
RL30297, CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET RESOLUTIONS: HISTORICAL INFORMATION 3–4 (2012),
available at http://www.senate.gov/CRSReports/crs-publish.cfm?pid=’0E%2C*PLS2%23
%20%20%20%0A.
22 See Congressional Budget Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-344, § 201(a)–(b), 88 Stat.
297, 302–03.  This provision was later repealed by the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act
of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, § 13210(2), 104 Stat. 1388, 1388–620.
23 See Congressional Budget Act of 1974 § 310(c), 88 Stat. at 315; Krishnakumar, supra
note 11, at 592. R
24 See Congressional Budget Act of 1974 § 310(a), 88 Stat. at 315; Krishnakumar, supra
note 11, at 592–93. R
25 See Congressional Budget Act of 1974 § 310(c), 88 Stat. at 315; Krishnakumar, supra
note 11, at 593. R
26 ROBERT KEITH & BILL HENIFF, JR., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33030, THE BUDGET
RECONCILIATION PROCESS: HOUSE AND SENATE PROCEDURES 2 (2005), available at http://
assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RL33030_20050810.pdf.
27 See Congressional Budget Act of 1974 § 310(e)(2), 88 Stat. at 315; Krishnakumar,
supra note 11, at 593. R
28 For an overview of reconciliation measures, see MEGAN SUZANNE LYNCH, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., R40480, BUDGET RECONCILIATION MEASURES ENACTED INTO LAW:
1980–2010 (2010), available at http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/R40480_20100902.pdf.
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C. Reconciliation as a Deficit-Reducing Tool
For the first years following the enactment of the Budget Act, Congress
did not write reconciliation instructions.  Instead, in a practice called
“assumed legislative savings,” the budget committees trusted that the subject
matter committees would voluntarily comply with the goals set forth in the
budget resolution, which prescribed a reduction of spending.29
During this era of voluntary compliance, budget resolutions easily
passed Congress but, unsurprisingly, the committees failed to comply with
the suggested levels of spending.30  In light of this, other alternatives became
necessary.31  In the spring of 1980, Democratic leaders and the President
boldly decided to use the first budget resolution, rather than the second as
prescribed in the Budget Act, to initiate reconciliation procedures for consid-
eration of legislation that would balance the budget and alleviate inflation.32
The legal authority for this development was the “elastic clause” of the
Budget Act, which authorized the House and Senate to include in the budget
resolution “any other procedure which is considered appropriate to carry out
the purposes of this Act.”33  The Budget committees argued that early recon-
ciliation was necessary to give the authorizing committees sufficient time to
consider the legislation prior to the fiscal year.34  In the end, the reconcilia-
tion process enabled Congress to reduce spending, including entitlements
that were previously excluded by the Budget Act, and to raise revenues,
resulting in $8.2 billion in savings.35  The use of reconciliation in the spring
resolution set a precedent to which Congress has adhered.  By the early
1980s, the House and Senate decided to eliminate the second budget resolu-
tion altogether, a practice that would be codified in 1985.36
In 1981, Republican leaders in the Senate and newly elected Ronald
Reagan developed a plan to take advantage of the precedent set in 1980 to
use the first resolution for reconciliation instructions.  This allowed the coor-
dination and passage of an ambitious policy initiative achieving $130.6 billion
in savings early in Reagan’s presidency.  Such remarkable savings were
achieved solely through cuts in entitlements and discretionary spending.37
The 1981 reconciliation legislation would disprove naysayers who thought
the process would ultimately fail due to its conflict with the decentralized
29 GILMOUR, supra note 11, at 105 (internal quotation marks omitted). R
30 Id. at 106.
31 KEITH & HENIFF, supra note 26, at 3.
32 GILMOUR, supra note 11, at 108–09. R
33 See Congressional Budget Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-344, § 301(b)(2), 88 Stat. 297,
307.  Later this clause was re-designated as § 310(b)(4).
34 COMM. ON THE BUDGET, 98TH CONG., REVIEW OF THE RECONCILIATION PROCESS 17
(Comm. Print 1984).
35 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-499, 94 Stat. 2599.  For
an overview of this historic use of reconciliation, see Miller & Range, supra note 11.
36 Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-177, 99
Stat. 1037; KEITH & HENIFF, supra note 26, at 6.
37 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, 95 Stat. 357.
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traditions of Congress.38  Instead, by essentially bypassing the necessity of
obtaining several hundred subcommittee and committee votes to cut over a
hundred programs, reconciliation provided a powerful means to enact the
preferences of the legislative majority.39  The scope of reconciliation, how-
ever, was not yet all-encompassing but was instead limited to deficit reduc-
tion.  Also enacted in 1981 was a $37.7 billion tax cut that moved outside of
the reconciliation process despite sufficient savings from the spending cuts to
offset the lost revenue from the cuts.40  As discussed below, Congress has
since discovered methods of passing tax cuts through reconciliation even
where their costs are not offset.41
In 1982, Congress again used reconciliation to reduce a growing deficit,
enacting two reconciliation bills to cut spending in entitlements and to raise
taxes.42  Over the next several years, party leaders repeatedly used reconcilia-
tion to enact tax increases and spending reductions, establishing a pattern of
reducing the deficit through the fast-track process.43
D. Reconciliation as a Catalyst
Despite reconciliation legislation aimed at deficit reduction, a balloon-
ing deficit in the mid-1980s caused Congress to reexamine the budget pro-
cess.  In 1985, the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act (GRH) was enacted.  Unlike
the neutrality of the original Budget Act, GRH imposed rules to impede
enactment of deficit-increasing legislation.  GRH promised to balance the
budget by 1991 and, to achieve this goal, mandated that the deficit fall by $36
billion a year.  GRH required that the Comptroller General decline to spend,
or sequester spending, if Congress and the President failed to meet these
annual targets for deficit reduction.44
Two years later, the Supreme Court struck down this structure as uncon-
stitutional, reasoning that GRH vested executive power in an officer remova-
ble by the legislative branch, thereby violating separation of powers
38 GILMOUR, supra note 11, at 135–37 (explaining that reconciliation forces action on R
policies that were previously bottled up in committee).
39 Id. at 122–23.
40 Demetrios Caraley, Changing Conceptions of Federalism, 101 POL. SCI. Q. 289, 303
(1986).
41 See infra notes 65–81 and accompanying text.
42 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-253, 96 Stat. 763; Tax
Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 324.
43 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, 107 Stat. 312;
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, 104 Stat. 1388; Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-239, 103 Stat. 2106; Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203, 101 Stat. 1330; Omnibus Budget Reconcil-
iation Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-509, 100 Stat. 1874; Consolidated Omnibus Budget Rec-
onciliation Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-272, 100 Stat. 82; Omnibus Budget Reconciliation
Act of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-270, 98 Stat. 157.
44 Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-177, 99
Stat. 1037; see GILMOUR, supra note 11, at 185–86. R
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principles.45  In response, GRH was amended to grant the power of seques-
tration to the Office of Management and Budget and set 1993 as the new
deadline for a balanced budget.46
During the period that GRH was in effect, Congress continued to use
reconciliation for deficit reduction.  The hope was that the process would
help avoid sequestration.  A highly divided and partisan government, how-
ever, either led to legislation that achieved the GRH targets through budget
gimmicks or only a modest reduction in the deficit following contentious,
protracted budget negotiations.47
By the early 1990s, it became clear that the harsh sequestration mecha-
nism of GRH failed to significantly reduce the deficit.  This was largely due to
the unrealistic assumptions underlying the budget resolutions and presiden-
tial budgets.48  The tough annual targets set by GRH eventually gave way to
pay-as-you-go rules and discretionary spending caps as Congress and the Pres-
ident once again reformulated the budget process in the Budget Enforce-
ment Act of 1990 (BEA).49
During the months Congress was debating GRH, concern over the use of
the reconciliation process also arose.  The process had evolved such that con-
gressional members added unrelated amendments to the reconciliation bill
to secure their passage under the expedited process.  One of the original
drafters of the Budget Act, West Virginia Senator Robert Byrd, led the charge
towards reformation of the process and secured a safeguard, called the “Byrd
Rule,” that prevented the Senate from considering a reconciliation bill with
“extraneous provisions” or those unrelated to the budget.  In so doing, Byrd
intended to protect the efficiency of the reconciliation process and the delib-
erative character of the Senate.50  The Byrd Rule was codified in 1985 and
defines such forbidden provisions to include those not producing any
change in revenues or outlays.51  The inclusion of extraneous material is sub-
ject to a point of order that, once raised, can be waived only by a three-fifths
vote of the Senate.52
Congress has expanded and revised the Byrd Rule over the years.  For
instance, in 1987, a controversy arose as to reconciliation legislation that,
although deficit decreasing in immediate years, produced deficits beyond the
45 Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 736 (1986).
46 The Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Reaffirmation Act of 1987,
Pub. L. No. 100-119, 101 Stat. 754.  The pay-as-you go rules required that, under threat of
sequester, increases in entitlement spending or decreases in revenues be deficit-neutral,
hence requiring offsets from tax increases or spending decreases.  The statutory rules
expired in 2002 but were reinstated in 2010 by the Statutory Pay-As-You-Go Act, Pub. L. No.
111-139, 124 Stat. 8 (2010).
47 See A History of Reconciliation, 49 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 116 (1993).
48 ROBERT D. LEE ET AL., PUBLIC BUDGETING SYSTEMS 289 (2008).
49 Budget Enforcement Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, 104 Stat. 1388.
50 KEITH, supra note 13, at 2.
51 Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-272,
§ 20,001, 100 Stat. 82, 390–91 (1986).
52 KEITH, supra note 13, at 4.
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budget window period.  In response, the Byrd Rule was amended to prevent
the Senate from considering reconciliation legislation or resolutions causing
spending increases or revenue decreases in fiscal years not covered by the
budget window period.53
The Byrd Rule would prove valuable to minority rights in the early 1990s
as President Clinton seized upon the reconciliation process to enact substan-
tial policy changes.  The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 con-
tained large tax increases on the wealthy and cuts in Medicare, defense, and
other spending.  These deficit-reducers were somewhat offset, however, by
new spending on items in the President’s political agenda, such as healthcare
and education.54  The controversial bill squeaked by Congress, failing to
receive a vote from a single Republican.55  Still, minority influence substan-
tially changed the shape of the bill.  In conference, Senate leaders ordered
removal of over 150 extraneous provisions to comply with the Byrd Rule.56
When Republicans regained control of Congress in 1995, they too would
pursue fulfillment of their campaign promises through the reconciliation
process.  Republicans presented a reconciliation bill dramatically scaling
back entitlement programs in fulfillment of their Contract with America cam-
paign pledge and cutting $245 billion in taxes, producing overall deficit neu-
trality.57  The Republicans also included in the bill the annual appropriations
and an increase in the debt limit, which was necessary to avoid federal
default, in hopes of forcing the President’s hand.58  The game of chicken
produced no immediate winners; instead, President Clinton vetoed the bill,
leading to a government shutdown.59
During the 1990s, the Byrd Rule would be invoked over eighty-one
times, as opposed to just five times in the 1980s.60  The intrepid use of the
reconciliation process by executive and congressional leadership to enact
social policy (rather than mere implementation of the annual budget), cou-
53 Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Reaffirmation Act of 1987, Pub. L.
No. 100-119, 101 Stat. 754.
54 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, 107 Stat. 312
(1993).
55 Deficit-Reduction Bill Narrowly Passed, 49 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 107, 107 (1993).
56 139 CONG. REC. S19,767 (daily ed. Aug. 6, 1993) (remarks of Sen. Jim Sasser) (“As
the distinguished ranking member indicated, I think over 150 items were removed from
the reconciliation instrument here, because it was felt that they would be subject to the
Byrd rule.”).
57 H.R. 2491, 104th Cong. (1995) (as received in the Senate).
58 Id. § 13801.
59 Krishnakumar, supra note 11, at 607; see also SHARON S. GRESSLE, CONG. RESEARCH R
SERV., SHUTDOWN OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT: CAUSES, EFFECTS, AND PROCESS 2–3 (2001)
(recounting the shutdown). Public opinion would later indict Congress as the culprit for
the stalemate.  Richard S. Conley, President Clinton and the Republican Congress, 1995–2000:
Political and Policy Dimensions of Veto Politics in Divided Government, 31 CONG. & PRESIDENCY
133, 151 (2004).
60 KEITH, supra note 13, at 10. R
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pled with increased partisanship, led to the minority’s heavy reliance on the
rule’s protections during the Clinton era.61
E. Reconciliation as a Deficit-Increasing Tool
The bold invocation of reconciliation by the Democrats in 1993 and the
failed attempt by the Republicans in 1995 paved the way for other expansive
uses of the process.  After the budget breakdown, in 1996 the Republicans
would try to dramatically cut taxes and decrease spending through reconcilia-
tion, the first test at passing deficit-increasing legislation through the pro-
cess.62  Heated debate over the practice ensued in the Senate, with the
Democrats charging that the reconciliation process existed only to enforce
deficit reduction while Republicans argued that a tax cut did not violate any
of reconciliation’s requirements.63  Because the Balanced Budget Act of 1997
supplanted the reconciliation bill, the issue was not resolved that year.  In
subsequent years, Senate Republicans continued to push for reconciliation
tax cuts.64
In 1999, Congress passed a budget resolution instructing the tax com-
mittees to report a reconciliation bill that reduced revenues.65  To comply
with the Byrd Rule, the Senate Finance Committee sunsetted the tax cut in
2009 so its costs would be within the ten-year budget window.  This exploited
the letter of the Byrd Rule, which only required that reconciliation legislation
not decrease revenues or increase spending beyond the budget window period
(as opposed to within it).  The 1999 bill technically sunsetted; however, its
drafters reinstated the tax cut one day later.66  This gimmick was not enough
to waive the Byrd Rule point of order against the bill, and the Senate ulti-
mately struck the provision that reinstated the cuts.67  Although the Republi-
cans lost the battle, they won the war.  The 1999 reconciliation bill was
ultimately vetoed but laid a precedent by which reconciliation tax cuts could
be enacted, albeit with a true sunset date.  After the waiver vote was cast,
Senator Breaux (D-LA) decried the result:
[T]his is terrible policy.  We literally are telling all the businesspeople . . .
and employees in this country [that] . . . no matter what the law is today, it is
going to fall off a cliff and go poof in 10 years. . . .
61 For example, in 1995, the Byrd Rule was used by Democrats to remove from the
reconciliation bill provisions limiting entitlement programs. KEITH, supra note 13, at R
25–26 tbl.4.
62 H.R. Con. Res. 178, 104th Cong. (1996); Kysar, The Sun Also Rises, supra note 3, at R
372.
63 Kysar, The Sun Also Rises, supra note 3, at 373. R
64 Id.
65 H.R. Con. Res. 68, 106th Cong. §§ 104–105 (1999).
66 Id.
67 Michael W. Evans, The Budget Process and the ‘Sunset’ Provision of the 2001 Tax Law, 99
TAX NOTES 405, 411 (2003).
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That is not good public policy; it is not good tax policy, and it points to the
problem: the fact that we are bringing up tax legislation in this reconcilia-
tion scenario . . . .68
The issue erupted again in 2001 when Senate Republicans wished to
enact the nation’s largest tax cut in history through the reconciliation pro-
cess.  Reconciliation was necessary because the Senate, at the time, was evenly
split.  Byrd lamented the Senate’s abuse of the process, arguing that despite
the original Budget Act’s failure to distinguish between tax increases and tax
cuts, “several amendments to the . . . Act have made it quite clear that the
purpose of reconciliation was for deficit reduction.”69  The Republicans
eventually won the procedural fight after garnering support from the Senate
Parliamentarian, the nonpartisan arbiter of Senate rules.70  Beginning in
2001 and continuing in 2003 and 2006, reconciliation was used to enact sev-
eral of the nation’s largest tax cuts, all of which were sunsetted to comply
with the Byrd Rule and to reduce costs to win the support of key centrists.71
Examining whether reconciliation should have accommodated tax cuts
requires a discussion of the origins and evolution of the process.  During the
floor debates over the Budget Act, reconciliation received very little attention
since, as originally enacted, it was only a minor provision.72  Thus, its original
purpose has been hotly debated.  It is fair to say that the drafters intended for
reconciliation to assist Congress in changing current law in order to meet the
policies of the budget resolution, and thus it certainly had the potential to
assist Congress in deficit reduction.  But given the Budget Act’s neutrality
towards deficit spending, there is no clear evidence that the drafters of the
Act intended reconciliation to be used only in a deficit-reducing manner.
Although the ability of the budget committees to seek lower deficits through
the targets set in the budget resolution arguably suggested “a small bias
toward deficit reduction,” the lack of “constitutional spending caps and reve-
nue floors” in the Act indicated that the process was not designed to produce
major budgetary reform.73
Indeed, some liberals supported the Budget Act as a transparent means
to justify deficits as necessary to combating unemployment, while conserva-
tives applauded the Act’s ability to help Congress reduce deficits.74  To con-
fuse matters more, the Act was also envisioned as a way to stop presidential
impoundments, a goal somewhat paradoxical to limiting spending.  Because
the procedures ultimately embraced by the Act were neutral towards substan-
68 145 CONG. REC. S18,178–79 (daily ed. July 28, 1999) (remarks of Sen. John Breaux).
69 147 CONG. REC. S5651–52 (daily ed. Apr. 5, 2001) (remarks of Sen. Robert Byrd).
70 SCHICK, supra note 11, at 142–49.
71 Kysar, The Sun Also Rises, supra note 3, at 375–81. R
72 Miller & Range, supra note 11, at 6.
73 Roy T. Meyers & Philip G. Joyce, Congressional Budgeting at Age 30: Is It Worth Saving?,
25 PUB. BUDGETING & FIN. 68, 71 (2005).
74 GILMOUR, supra note 11, at 80–85. R
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tive policies, these various factions of supporters could simultaneously hold
contradictory views of its purposes.75
Although a single, original purpose of reconciliation cannot be stated
definitively, when congressional members began to use the reconciliation
process in a manner that would sweep in policies that were non-budget
related or increased deficits in the years beyond the budget window, Con-
gress as a whole responded by enacting the Byrd Rule.  Indeed, the fact that
the Byrd Rule only prevented deficit increases in outer budget years meant
that its drafters did not even contemplate the ability to have deficit increases
within the budget window period.  It could thus fairly be stated that congres-
sional members limited the scope of reconciliation early on, and that its lean-
ings quickly evolved towards deficit reduction.  Indeed, from its inception
through the 1990s, reconciliation was exclusively employed to reduce the def-
icit.76  It was only as the deficits lifted in the mid-1990s that controversy
began to arise over whether the reconciliation process could be used to enact
tax cuts.77
Lamenting over reconciliation’s deviation from its deficit-reducing past
at this late date is nonetheless likely futile.  The original purpose behind rec-
onciliation has long ceased to cabin it; Congress has even used reconciliation
to enact arguably non-budget-related legislation.78  Instead, an examination
of the policy and political ramifications of its use in different contexts is more
worthwhile and a topic I take up in Parts II and III.  Such an endeavor is
particularly valuable given recent developments, discussed below, demon-
strating that the scope of the reconciliation process is ever more fluid and
contested.
F. Reconciliation in Flux
1. The Continued Controversy over Tax Cuts
When Congress changed hands in 2007, the majority party once again
altered the reconciliation process in accordance with its policy preferences.
Still outraged at the use of reconciliation for tax cuts, the House and Senate
each imposed new points of order against reconciliation bills that increased
the deficit or reduced the surplus over Republican opposition.79  Specifically,
the rules provided that the houses could not consider a budget resolution
containing reconciliation instructions (in the case of the House) or reconcili-
75 Id. at 84.
76 ROBERT KEITH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30458, THE BUDGET RECONCILIATION PRO-
CESS: TIMING OF LEGISLATIVE ACTION 4 (2005).
77 Kysar, The Sun Also Rises, supra note 3, at 372. R
78 For instance, in 2007, Congress enacted the College Cost Reduction and Access Act,
Pub. L. No. 110-84, 121 Stat. 784 (2007), which reduced government subsidies to student
loan lenders, lowered interest rates on subsidized loans, and provided funding for Pell
Grants.  No Byrd Rule point of order was made. KEITH, supra note 13, at 23 tbl.4. R
79 H.R. Res. 6, 110th Cong. (2007); S. Con. Res. 21, 110th Cong. (submitted as
amended on May 8, 2007).
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ation legislation itself (in the case of the Senate) that reduced the surplus or
increased the deficit for either (a) the period comprising the current fiscal
year and the next five fiscal years or (b) the period comprising the fiscal year
and the next ten fiscal years.  Unlike the Senate, the House renews its rules at
the start of each Congress.  Although the House renewed the point of order
in 2009,80 it promptly reversed itself in 2011 when it changed hands to the
Republicans.  Current House rules delete the prohibition against deficit-
increasing reconciliation, replacing it instead with a rule that forbids use of
the reconciliation process if legislation increases net spending.81
2. The Debate over Health Care
In 2009, in perhaps the most contentious use of the process, Democrats
seized upon reconciliation as a means to enact major health care reform.82
Although Senate Budget chairman, Kent Conrad (D-ND) originally opposed
the use of reconciliation as an unrealistic process for handling such a major
initiative, he changed course under pressure from the White House and
drafted the reconciliation instructions for the 2010 budget resolution to
include healthcare reform.83  In an unexpected turn of events, the preserva-
tion of the use of reconciliation for health care reform proved essential to its
success when, on January 19, 2010, the Democrats lost their sixtieth vote in
the Senate before key differences between the initial House and Senate bills
had been ironed out.84
Many aspects of the reform plan fell outside the scope of reconciliation.
A strategy developed such that the House would vote on the Senate bill,
which the Senate had already passed on December 24, 2009, but also on a
reconciliation bill that contained certain legislative compromises as well as an
overhaul of the college loan program.  The strategy was risky in that the
House had to trust the Senate to pass the reconciliation bill, but it paid off.
The Byrd Rule was employed to strike only two minor provisions when the
reconciliation bill reached the Senate.  Senator Byrd even voted for the rec-
onciliation bill, despite the fact that he had previously thwarted attempts by
President Clinton to pass healthcare reform using reconciliation in 1993.85
Reconciliation as a vehicle for health care reform proved divisive, with
Republicans strongly rejecting its propriety.  The issue became one of
national public debate.  The Republicans’ aggressive use of reconciliation for
the Bush tax cuts emboldened the Democrats to make cunning use of the
80 H.R. Res. 5, 111th Cong. (2009).
81 H.R. Res. 5, 112th Cong. (2011).
82 Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124
Stat. 1029.  Other parts of the healthcare reform plan are enacted under the Patient Pro-
tection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010).
83 BARBARA SINCLAIR, UNORTHODOX LAWMAKING 187 (2012).
84 Id. at 208. Scott Brown (R-MA) won the seat vacated upon Ted Kennedy’s death.
Id. at 211–13.
85 Carl Hulse, A Health Legislation Fail-Safe Works, but Not as Expected, N.Y. TIMES (Mar.
27, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/28/us/politics/28cong.html.
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process, finally delivering on a promise to constituents that had been unful-
filled for decades.  But the victory may be short-lived.  Just as past “abuses” of
reconciliation justified pushing its boundaries in this context, Republicans
will no doubt use this precedent to do the same in the future.  Indeed, a day
after the Supreme Court upheld the individual mandate as within Congress’s
power to tax,86 Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-KY) used the
Court’s ruling as justification for moving a repeal of the health care act
through the reconciliation process, stating “[T]he Chief Justice said it is a
tax, and taxes are clearly what we call reconcilable.”87  Republicans have
more recently invoked the Democrats’ bold enactment of health care reform
through reconciliation to justify using the process to enact permanent tax cuts,
as discussed below.88
3. Fast-Track Tax Reform
Before the December 2012 deal was reached to permanently extend
most of the Bush tax cuts,89 Republican strategists contemplated repeal of
the Byrd Rule, a possibility that is increasingly less fanciful, in order to pass
permanent tax cuts through this process.90  Republicans have previously
adhered to the confines of the Byrd Rule, but it appears they are less willing
to do so subsequent to the Democrats’ passage of health care reform through
reconciliation.91  Although the Byrd Rule is codified into law, the houses
have ultimate purview over their own rules and can thus change, modify, or
waive them as a constitutional matter.92  In order to alter the rule, Republi-
cans could invoke the “nuclear option” or simply repeal the Byrd Rule within
the context of the budget resolution, which is not subject to the filibuster.93
86 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
87 Eric Pianin, GOP Eyes Arcane Budget Rule to Help Crush Obamacare, THE FISCAL TIMES
(July 3, 2012), http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/Articles/2012/07/03/GOP-Eyes-Arcane-
Budget-Rule-to-Help-Crush-Obamacare.aspx#page1 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Although many policy provisions in the health care law would fall outside the scope of
reconciliation, reconciliation could be used to repeal many of the law’s most contentious
provisions, such as the individual mandate and Medicare/Medicaid funding provisions
since these are budget-related.
88 See infra notes 89–105 and accompanying text.
89 See American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-240, 126 Stat. 2313.
90 Goldfarb, supra note 5.
91 Id. (“Although Republicans previously have worked within the constraints of the
Byrd Rule, their appetite for pushing the limits of majority rule appears to have grown
since Democrats managed to reshape the health care system without a single Republican
vote.”).
92 Rebecca M. Kysar, Listening to Congress: Earmark Rules and Statutory Interpretation, 94
CORNELL L. REV. 519, 525 (2009).
93 See, e.g., Martin B. Gold & Dimple Gupta, The Constitutional Option to Change Senate
Rules and Procedures: A Majoritarian Means to Overcome the Filibuster, 28 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 205, 219–27 (2004) (describing the constitutional option as the Senate choosing
rules governing its procedure by majority vote); David S. Law & Lawrence B. Solum, Judi-
cial Selection, Appointments Gridlock, and the Nuclear Option, 15 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 51,
60 (2006) (describing the nuclear option as the “ruling of the chair sustained by simple
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They could also invoke the aforementioned “elastic clause” of the Budget Act
to justify permanent tax cuts, as was done to dramatically expand the scope of
reconciliation in 1981.94
Although Congress resolved the immediate uncertainty over the expir-
ing tax cuts, tax reform remains a necessary goal in controlling the deficit
and increasing economic efficiency.  Without specifying details, President
Obama took the position that a “fast-track” process for tax reform should be
part of any deal surrounding the fiscal cliff,95 and the Senate’s FY 2014
Budget Resolution contemplates using reconciliation for tax reform that
would raise revenues by nearly $1 trillion.96  House Republicans have also
recently championed and passed a new fast-track legislative process for tax
reform.97  The proposed process has features similar to the reconciliation
process.  Fast-track tax reform would, like reconciliation, require the relevant
committees to report tax reform legislation by a certain deadline and would
provide for expedited consideration in both the House and Senate.
Specifically, under the new House bill, the House Ways and Means Com-
mittee is charged with introducing tax reform legislation not later than April
30th of 2013.98  In the House, the fast-track tax reform bill then would
receive expedited placement on the calendar and is subject to limited debate
and amendments.99  For instance, after introduction of the tax reform bill by
Ways and Means, the House Rules Committee has only fifteen days to move
the bill to floor consideration, at which point the bill would automatically be
placed on the calendar.  After the bill proceeds to the Senate, it must be
reported out of the Senate Finance Committee within fifteen days, at which
point it also receives expedited consideration on the Senate floor.100  During
consideration in the Senate, a cloture vote would not be necessary for a
motion to proceed or on amendments but would still be required to end
consideration of the bill.101  In this manner, the filibuster is irrelevant for
certain preliminary votes of fast-track tax reform but is still a possible obstacle
to final passage of the bill.
Tax reform is defined in the bill in a partisan fashion, encompassing
only those proposals that would accomplish one of the following: (a) flatten
the rate structure to two rates between 10% and 25%; (b) reduce the corpo-
majority . . . [in order] to achieve cloture”); Tom Udall, The Constitutional Option: Reforming
the Rules of the Senate to Restore Accountability and Reduce Gridlock, 5 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 115,
115 (2011) (arguing Senate has right to exercise constitutional option).
94 See supra notes 32–35 and accompanying text. R
95 See Weisman, supra note 5. R
96 S. Con. Res. 8, 113th Cong. (2013).
97 Pathway to Job Creation Through a Simpler, Fairer Tax Code Act of 2012, H.R.
6169, 112th Cong. (as reported in House, Aug. 2, 2012).
98 Id. § 3(a).  The legislation must begin in the House due to the Origination Clause
of the Constitution. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
99 H.R. 6169 § 3(c).
100 Id. § 3(d).
101 Michael M. Gleeson, House Passes Fast-Track Tax Reform Bill, TAX NOTES TODAY, Aug.
3, 2012, available at 2012 TNT 150-4 (LEXIS).
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rate tax rate to 25% or below; (c) repeal the Alternative Minimum Tax; (d)
broaden the base to maintain revenue between 18% and 19% of the econ-
omy; and (e) change from a worldwide to a territorial system of taxation.102
Accordingly, some have dismissed the procedural reform efforts as merely
symbolic.103  We can expect, however, that measures aimed at modifying the
tax legislative process to facilitate legislative action will continue to be a part
of congressional dialogue.  As one former Senate aide has expressed about
the House’s fast-track tax reform proposal, “[g]etting the process is as impor-
tant as getting to yes.”104  Some of these measures will succeed in the future,
although most likely in a less partisan version.
II. RECONCILING TAX REFORM
As the above discussion illustrates, reconciliation has evolved into a pow-
erful, flexible tool that can apply to virtually any tax measure.  Yet continual
reliance upon the reconciliation process, or other fast-track processes, to
enact tax legislation entails unexpected costs both to the nation’s fiscal
health and to tax policy.  For reasons I explain below, fast-track processes are
unlikely to produce fundamental tax reform and indeed create conditions
where it is less likely to develop.
A. The Need for Fundamental Tax Reform
Current tax reform efforts seek to protect the tax base by reducing the
leakiness of our worldwide international tax system,105 to reduce existing tax
incentives that distort behavior,106 to broaden the base by eliminating tax
expenditures, such as the home mortgage interest deduction,107 to eliminate
the inconsistent taxation of complicated financial instruments, and to reas-
sess the taxation of investment income through mark-to-market rules,108 car-
102 H.R. 6169 § 3(a).
103 See, e.g., Meg Shreve, Proposed Expedited Tax Reform Raises Questions, TAX NOTES
TODAY, July 27, 2012, available at 2012 TNT 145-4 (LEXIS) (quoting House Rules minority
member Louise McIntosh Slaughter as stating that the bill “is something shiny to waive in
front of the American people to distract them from the fact that Republicans have no
actual plan to achieve the lofty goals listed in th[e] bill.”).
104 Id. (quoting a former Senate aide as stating that the proposal offers an early idea of
what the tax reform process looks like, but ultimately the parameters of the process will be
negotiated between the House and Senate).
105 See, e.g., Alison Bennett, Administration Budget Intended to Stop Firms from Shifting Jobs,
Profits Overseas, BNA DAILY TAX REPORT (Feb. 14, 2012).
106 In the corporate tax area, for instance, debt-financing is tax-advantaged largely
because of the double-taxation of equity-financed corporate income.
107 Daniel Shaviro, Tax Reform Implications of the Risk of a U.S. Budget Catastrophe, 50 U.
LOUISVILLE L. REV. 577, 581 (2012) (describing base-broadening as “[t]he most obvious
and appealing way to achieve budgetary improvement through the existing income tax”).
108 See David S. Miller, Op-Ed., The Zuckerberg Tax, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 7, 2012), http://
www.nytimes.com/2012/02/08/opinion/the-zuckerberg-tax.html (proposing a tax on the
appreciation of publicly traded securities, regardless of whether they have been sold).
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ried interest reform efforts,109 and consumption tax initiatives,110 among
other goals.  Exploring these various options is necessary because it appears
increasingly unlikely that our current tax base is robust enough to sustain a
sufficient level of government revenues without inhibiting economic growth.
As one model illustrates, “politically feasible tax increases within the current
tax structure cannot generate sufficient revenues to bring federal budget def-
icits under control.”111  Unlike in 1986, when tax reform was revenue-neu-
tral, there is a much stronger argument today that revenue concerns must
shape tax reform.112  In order to achieve a sustainable level of revenue,
lawmakers must either broaden the existing tax base113 or consider new
sources of revenue, such as value added taxes.114
Additionally, since the United States tax system must compete on an
international level to retain investment domestically, reliance on corporate
tax revenues will inevitably recede.  The United States currently has the high-
est corporate tax rate in the world115 and yet depends on an outdated, out-
109 See Victor Fleischer, Two and Twenty: Taxing Partnership Profits in Private Equity Funds,
83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 49 (2008) (advocating a “baseline rule that would treat carried interest
distributions as ordinary income”).
110 See MICHAEL J. GRAETZ, 100 MILLION UNNECESSARY RETURNS, at ix (2008) (proposing
a value-added tax, in combination with a payroll tax offset and an income tax on house-
holds earning over $100,000); Daniel N. Shaviro, Replacing the Income Tax With a Progressive
Consumption Tax, 103 TAX NOTES 91, 93–96 (2004) (describing the two main models of a
progressive consumption tax).
111 Roseanne Altshuler, Katherine Lim & Roberton Williams, Desperately Seeking Revenue,
TAX POLICY CENTER, at i (2010), available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/
412018_seeking_revenue.pdf.
112 See generally Daniel N. Shaviro, 1986-Style Tax Reform: A Good Idea Whose Time Has
Passed, 131 TAX NOTES 817 (2011) (arguing against 1986-style tax reform).  In addition to
budgetary concerns, revenue-neutral base broadening will likely have unfavorable distribu-
tional consequences. See Samuel Brown, William G. Gale, & Adam Looney, On the Distribu-
tional Effects of Base-Broadening Income Tax Reform, TAX POLICY CENTER (Aug. 1, 2012),
available at http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/1001628-Base-Broadening-Tax-
Reform.pdf.
113 See, e.g., Edward D. Kleinbard, The Role of Tax Reform in Deficit Reduction, TAX NOTES
1105 (Nov. 28, 2011) (emphasizing the role of base-broadening through the removal of tax
expenditures in addressing the fiscal crisis).
114 Many tax analysts believe that adoption of a VAT is a necessary component to avert-
ing a fiscal crisis. See, e.g., Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Political Pathway: When Will the U.S.
Adopt a VAT?, in THE VAT READER 334 (2011) (arguing for VAT option); Michael J. Graetz,
VAT as the Key to Real Tax Reform, in THE VAT READER, supra, at 112 (same); Rudolph G.
Penner, Do We Need a VAT to Solve Our Long-Run Budget Problems?, 63 TAX L. REV. 301 (2010)
(same).  Both liberal and conservative commentators have supported the idea that value-
added taxes are crucial to meeting revenue demands. See, e.g., Bruce Bartlett, A New Money
Machine for the U.S., L.A. TIMES (Aug. 29, 2004), http://articles.latimes.com/2004/aug/29/
opinion/op-bartlet29 (arguing that value-added tax is the best way of raising needed reve-
nue); William G. Gale and Benjamin H. Harris, A Value-Added Tax for the United States: Part
of the Solution, BROOKINGS INST. & TAX POL’Y CENTER 1 (July 2010), available at http://www.
taxpolicycenter.org/uploadedpdf/1001418_vat_solution.pdf (same).
115 WHITE HOUSE & THE U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, THE PRESIDENT’S FRAMEWORK FOR
BUSINESS TAX REFORM 2 (2012); Barack Obama, President of the United States of America,
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gunned international tax system to tax the foreign income of domestic
multinational corporations.116  To secure economic growth, policymakers
must also ensure that taxation of our multinational corporations is globally
competitive, perhaps by lowering corporate tax rates or reforming our inter-
national tax system.  In terms of tax policy, the United States has become an
outlier among developed nations, as it stands alone in not yet embracing
many of tax reform developments.117  Tax reform is thus vital in today’s
budgetary and global environment.118
B. Truncated Timelines as an Obstacle to Reform
So how should Congress go about formulating the sweeping tax reform
necessary to avert a budgetary crisis or loss of economic competitiveness?
Despite recent calls for its use in this context, Congress would be ill-advised
to resort to the reconciliation process or similar fast-track processes.
Although reconciliation’s primary aim is to enact deficit-reducing legislation,
its procedural limitations hinder its use even for revenue-increasing tax
reform.  Recall the humble beginnings of the reconciliation process as a neg-
ligible, fallback procedure to align the spending priorities in a given year
with overall budgetary targets.119  Although it has since developed into a
powerful instrument to effectuate legislative change, especially on the reve-
nue side, the legacy of its origins limit its capacity to produce ambitious tax
reform for several reasons.
First, major tax reform will likely require many months, possibly years, of
drafting and negotiating.  All of the aforementioned tax reform proposals
The State of The Union Address (Jan. 25, 2011), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/
the-press-office/2011/01/25/remarks-president-state-union-address.
116 Michael J. Graetz, The David R. Tillinghast Lecture—Taxing International Income: Inade-
quate Principles, Outdated Concepts, and Unsatisfactory Policies, 54 TAX L. REV. 261, 320 (2001).
117 See HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS, TESTIMONY OF MR. ROBERT A. MCDONALD,
CHAIRMAN, FISCAL POLICY INITIATIVE BUS. ROUNDTABLE BEFORE THE HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS
AND MEANS HEARING ON TAX REFORM 7 (Jan. 20, 2011), available at http://waysandmeans.
house.gov/uploadedfiles/brt_written_testimony.pdf; Sijbren Cnossen, A VAT Primer for
Lawyers, Economists, and Accountants, in THE VAT READER, supra note 114, at 23 (noting that
the U.S. is the only major country without a value-added tax, with more than 150 countries
adopting such a tax).
118 Some might contend that economic stimulus, rather than tax reform, is the appro-
priate course until full economic recovery has begun.  Delay, however, may mean deep
spending cuts and tax increases in response to the onset of a crisis, a result that is ineffi-
cient compared with spreading these painful policies over time. See generally Daniel
Shaviro, The Long-Term U.S. Fiscal Gap: Is the Main Problem Generational Inequity?, 77 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1298 (2009) (describing the phenomenon whereby tax rate increases and
spending cuts have rising marginal disutility in discrete periods as support for smoothing
those increases and cuts over time).  To ensure that economic recovery is not disrupted,
policymakers could employ phased-in or delayed effective dates for reform. See Shaviro,
supra note 107, at 582; see also Michael J. Graetz, Legal Transitions: The Case of Retroactivity in
Income Tax Revision, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 47, 87 (1977) (recommending phased-in or delayed
effective dates where politically expedient to alleviate large losses from changes in law).
119 See supra notes 22–28 and accompanying text. R
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would necessitate sophisticated and complex changes to the tax code, which
would be difficult to achieve within reconciliation’s budget cycle or the trun-
cated timeline contemplated by the House’s recently proposed fast-track tax
reform process.  Although health care reform was an obviously complicated
piece of legislation, the major policy initiatives were formulated outside of
the reconciliation process over a long period of time.120  Tax reform will be
no different.
The Tax Reform Act of 1986, for instance, evolved over the course of two
years.121  Prior tax reform efforts took years and extensive debate.122  The
House’s proposed fast-track tax reform process would require legislation to
be reported out of committee by April 30, 2013, an unrealistic timeline.123
Similarly, because the reconciliation process typically allows only a few short
months between the adoption of the budget resolution, which often does not
occur until after the April 15th deadline,124 and the October 1st deadline for
reporting the legislation prior to the start of the next fiscal year, it is very
difficult to push complex changes to the Tax Code through the reconcilia-
tion process.125  Although Congress often passes reconciliation legislation
subsequent to this deadline, it typically does so before the end of the calen-
dar year, still operating on a truncated timeline.126  Also, while Congress con-
siders reconciliation legislation in an abbreviated fashion, its attention
towards the annual appropriations suffers, resulting in breakdowns in the
budget process.127  One can expect that sweeping reform efforts through rec-
onciliation amplify this effect.
Because of the shortened process, reconciliation proposals produced by
both tax committees are usually considered simultaneously in the first week
of October.  This has two effects.  Simultaneous action exerts pressure on the
120 Even the pieces of health care that moved through the reconciliation process did so
a few months after the typical deadline for reconciliation legislation. SINCLAIR, supra note
83, at 215–17, 227–30.
121 JEFFREY H. BIRNBAUM & ALAN S. MURRAY, SHOWDOWN AT GUCCI GULCH: LAWMAKERS,
LOBBYISTS, AND THE UNLIKELY TRIUMPH OF TAX REFORM (1987) (chronicling the 1986 tax
overhaul).
122 For example, the Bankruptcy Tax Act of 1980, in which the tax treatment of bank-
rupt taxpayers was clarified, took nearly four years after “extensive debate and comment.”
Harold R. Handler, Budget Reconciliation and the Tax Law: Legislative History or Legislative
Hysteria?, 37 TAX NOTES 1259, 1262–63 (1987). The Subchapter S Revision Act of 1982,
which eliminated the double taxation of closely-held corporations on an elective basis, was
enacted after two and a half years of consideration. Id.
123 See Shreve, supra note 103 at 145-4 (quoting a former House aide as stating that
although groundwork efforts at tax reform have been laid, an April 2013 deadline was
ambitious).
124 BINDER, supra note 1, at 76. R
125 McLure, supra note 9, at 79.
126 See CONG. RESEARCH SERV., CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, THE BUDGET RECONCILIA-
TION PROCESS: HOUSE AND SENATE PROCEDURES 69–74 (2005), available at http://assets.
opencrs.com/rpts/RL33030_20050810.pdf.
127 See Krishnakumar, supra note 11, at 614 (“Reconciliation thus draws Congress’s
focus away from the annual appropriations process . . . .”).
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resources of the committees and the houses, making deliberation less care-
ful.128  Additionally, it interferes with the classical model for the enactment
of tax legislation as designated by the Constitution.129  The Origination
Clause requires that revenue legislation begin its path through the legislative
process in the House, the part of Congress “closest to the people” because of
its proportional representation.130  The Senate Finance Committee staff has
observed this dynamic as a problematic aspect of reconciliation, requesting
the Budget Committee to set reconciliation dates so that they “can see the
actual handiwork of the House before we reach our final decision . . . or
structure the dates so that [they] can return to a system when [they] are not
marking up two bills during one week in October.”131  With consequences I
have explored in other contexts, the reconciliation process problematically
reduces the House’s purview over revenue legislation.132  As a result, it tends
to reduce the democratic character of tax laws, produces negative political
economy consequences, and fails to leverage the tax expertise of the Ways
and Means Committee.133
The harried pace of fast-track may also lessen the impact of two sources
of expert information critical to tax reform efforts—the Treasury Depart-
ment and the Joint Committee of Taxation.134  Because comprehensive tax
reform will involve substantial policy changes, the legislature will require
extensive analysis from these entities.  Fast-track can, in theory, be utilized to
steamroll sweeping changes through the legislature; however, it also takes
away the time necessary to design and effectuate such change in a careful
manner.
Finally, the aforementioned tendency of the reconciliation process to
displace committee power in favor of party leadership is problematic for
achieving true tax reform because it reduces the power of key sources of
organization and specialization in creating a complex tax bill—the members
of the tax-writing committees.135  Although these committees determine the
details of a reconciliation bill, the process removes their discretion to report
128 Federal Bar Ass’n, The Condition of the Tax Legislative Process, 39 TAX NOTES 1581,
1587 (June 27, 1988).
129 See McLure, supra note 9, at 74–75 (describing the enactment of the 1982 reconcili-
ation bill as in tension with the Origination Clause due to the minimal role of the House).
130 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1 (“All Bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the
House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with Amendments as on
other Bills.”); see Rebecca M. Kysar, On the Constitutionality of Tax Treaties, 38 YALE J. INT’L L.
1 (2013).
131 Federal Bar Ass’n, supra note 128, at 1587.
132 For background on the clause as well as policy reasons supporting its enforcement
in the tax treaty context, see Kysar, supra note 130.
133 Id.
134 See Michael J. Graetz, Reflections on the Tax Legislative Process: Prelude to Reform, 58 VA.
L. REV. 1389, 1408–09 (1972) (identifying the input from Treasury and the JCT as central
to tax reform).
135 Notably, the tax-writing committees appear opposed to using reconciliation for tax
reform.  Goldfarb, supra note 5.
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a bill and also mandates certain parameters for the bill.  Although commit-
tees themselves have been blamed for congressional gridlock,136 their exper-
tise is indispensable to the design of tax reform.137  Indeed, in a complex
field like tax, subcommittees formed around specialized areas of the law
might be advisory to effectuate legislative action.138
These features of reconciliation may thwart massive reform in other leg-
islative areas, but an area as intricate as tax will be particularly challenged by
the fast-track limitations of the process.139  Former Assistant Treasury Secre-
tary John Nolan has noted the general impact of reconciliation on tax legisla-
tion, stating that “we have departed from an orderly and predictable process
for identifying the legislative issues in advance and dealing with them in
some well-organized way.”140  These shortcomings may be overcome by rec-
onciliation’s capacity to break stalemate if change is accomplished by simple
means such as rate changes.  Complex tax reform, however, likely requires
more congressional resources than reconciliation can offer.
C. Immoderate, Unstable Policy
1. The Polarizing Influence of the Reconciliation Process
One consequence to circumventing the filibuster through the reconcilia-
tion process is the production of less moderate legislation, which has a
greater likelihood of being vetoed or overturned by a later Congress.  These
consequences present an obvious challenge to the formulation of a long-term
solution to the nation’s fiscal crisis.
The observation that a supermajority rule counter-intuitively leads to
more moderate decision-making has been observed primarily in the judicial
filibuster context.141  Using positive political theory, John McGinnis and
136 See BARBARA SINCLAIR, PARTY WARS 67–109 (2006) (describing the House committee
structure as a source of gridlock).
137 See George K. Yin, Is the Tax System Beyond Reform?, 58 U. FLA. L. REV. 977, 1034
(2006) (noting that the loss of the subject matter expertise of committees “may be felt
most acutely in connection with more involved legislative efforts, such as fundamental
reform initiatives, which are likely to raise many interrelated issues for legislative considera-
tion and decision making.”) .
138 See Graetz, supra note 134, at 1405.
139 Handler, supra note 122, at 1266 (observing that because “the Internal Revenue
Code is an incredibly complex document dealing with vast areas that require considerable
correlation and coordination[,] [i]t is virtually impossible to imagine that any kind of sen-
sible tax reform can be effected in a helter-skelter fashion under circumstances where the
only rationale for developing any reform is the revenue-raising function of the budget
reconciliation process.”).
140 Federal Bar Ass’n, supra note 128, at 1583
141 See Catherine Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, In Defense of Filibustering Judicial Nomina-
tions, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 331, 342–43 (2005) (defending the filibuster as a check on
immoderate judicial appointments); John Ferejohn & Pasquale Pasquino, Constitutional
Adjudication: Lessons From Europe, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1671, 1681 (2004) (arguing that
supermajority rules for European justices lead to a judiciary dominated by judicial moder-
ates); John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, The Judicial Filibuster, the Median Senator,
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Michael Rappaport have modeled this tendency, illustrating that a
supermajoritarian voting rule produces more moderate judicial nominations
than a majoritarian rule.  This is due to the need to appease the “pivotal
Senator,” or the senator whose ideology is closest to the President and whose
support the President needs to secure a supermajority vote, rather than sim-
ply the median, or fifty-first, senator.142  Rather than producing a compro-
mise at some point between the President and the median senator, as would
be the case under majoritarianism, supermajority rules lead to an agreement
closer to the median senator.143
This analysis can be extended to the legislative context, where we can
expect that supermajority rules will produce legislation that is more moder-
ate, or closer to the ideology of the median senator.144  Where fast-track
processes remove the supermajority rules, they produce more controversial
legislation.
Additionally, it may be the case that fast-track processes are less likely to
lead to fundamental tax reform that is desirable from a policy perspective.
The tax-writing committees have expressed concern over using the reconcili-
ation process for tax reform for this reason, arguing that “a measure
advanced only by Republicans would be less popular and perhaps even less
substantive than one that wins significant support from Democrats.”145  Addi-
tionally, a lack of bipartisan compromise will lead to legislation that fails to
produce the requisite level of revenues.  This is because no one party wants
to be blamed for hardships caused by increased taxes and decreased spend-
and the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, 2005 SUP. CT. REV. 257 (2005) [hereinafter McGinnis
& Rappaport, The Judicial Filibuster]; John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport,
Supermajority Rules and the Judicial Confirmation Process, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 543, 557 (2005);
Judith Resnick, Judicial Selection and Democratic Theory: Demand, Supply, and Life Tenure, 26
CARDOZO L. REV. 579, 637–38 (2005) (positing that a supermajority rule in judicial selec-
tion produces “movement towards a middle ground”); Lee Epstein, A Better Way to Appoint
Justices, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Mar. 17, 1992), http://www.csmonitor.com/1992/0317/
17191.html (arguing that a supermajority rule results in judges being chosen for their
“legal credentials” to gain “bipartisan support”).
142 See McGinnis & Rappaport, The Judicial Filibuster, supra note 141, at 261–81.
143 Id.
144 A possible circumstance where this would not be true is where the pivotal senator
had disproportionate bargaining power with the President, thus producing a result closer
to her view rather than that of the median senator.  In the tax context, however, the Presi-
dent has strong agenda-setting ability due to being the first-mover in budgetary politics.
Jacob E. Gersen & Eric A. Posner, Soft Law: Lessons from Congressional Practice, 61 STAN. L.
REV. 573, 589 (2008); see also Josh Chafetz, Congress’s Constitution, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 715
(2012) (discussing the President’s first-mover advantage in the appropriations context).
This would likely translate to greater leverage in the formulation of budget-related
legislation.
145 Goldfarb, supra note 5 (also quoting a former Senate Republican leadership aide as
stating that reconciliation “drives you to starker decision making” thus undermining the
creation of “clear lines of communication, mutual understanding of each chamber’s priori-
ties and an appreciation of the general outline of what could look like the best way to
proceed” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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ing, but if the parties together took on such blame, the total burdens become
much more tolerable from a political perspective.
Reconciliation will also tend to produce disagreement between Congress
and the executive.  Although fast-track processes may hasten agreement over
budget policy within Congress, they lack procedural mechanisms to harmo-
nize congressional and executive budget priorities.146  The lack of a coordi-
nating device with the President is problematic in times of divided
government.  Not only is immoderate legislation more likely to attract a presi-
dential veto, when the President vetoes legislation, Congress is less likely to
have sufficient support to override the veto.147  Reconciliation thus produces
legislation that is more likely to create a budgetary stalemate.148  It is not
surprising, then, that reconciliation bills initiated without executive support
tend to fail in times of divided government.149  Thus, although reconciliation
is often held out as a solution to stalemate in the tax area, it may ironically
increase the risk for legislative inaction when the preferences of the Presi-
dent and Congress do not align.
In contrast, the past three tax reform acts occurred during times of
divided government but notably were enacted outside of the reconciliation
process.150  The Tax Reform Act of 1969 was enacted during the Republican
Nixon era with substantial input from congressional Democrats, using pro-
posals from the prior Democratic Treasury Department as a template.  The
Tax Reform Act of 1976 was enacted thanks to a partnership between the
Republican Ford administration and a Democratically-controlled Congress.
Finally, the Tax Reform Act of 1986 was engineered by the Republican Rea-
gan administration and a divided Congress.151  Party competition during the
1986 tax reform efforts jump-started the process at several critical points and
eventually gave way to bipartisan compromise.152
146 See Krishnakumar, supra note 11, at 610–13. See generally Tiefer, supra note 9 (not-
ing the benefits of the checks and balances of the normal lawmaking process).  Although
Congress has no mechanism internal to the reconciliation process to pressure the Presi-
dent to sign reconciliation bills, Congress may try to withhold continuing resolutions for
appropriations or debt limit extensions.  This tactic may backfire, however, if government
shutdowns occur.  Krishnakumar, supra note 11, at 610–13.
147 DAVID W. BRADY & CRAIG VOLDEN, REVOLVING GRIDLOCK 15–16 (1998). If, for
instance, legislative preferences are ranked on a scale of one to one hundred on a liberal-
conservative continuum, legislation during divided government must accord with the pref-
erences of the 40th through 66th senators to override a presidential veto. Id.
148 An example of this tendency is the 1995 reconciliation bill, which produced major
changes to welfare and Medicaid.  Reconciliation conferees removed much of the moder-
ates’ changes that might have placated the president.  Doing so arguably triggered the
presidential veto.  Krishnakumar, supra note 11, at 620.
149 Id. at 610–13.
150 See Yin, supra note 137, at 1031 (“[I]t may not be coincidental that the three tax acts
that have garnered the ‘tax reform’ label have all occurred during periods of divided gov-
ernment when bipartisan compromise was necessary.”).
151 See id. at 1031–32.
152 See id. at 1032 n.213.  Political scientists debate whether important legislative reform
is more or less likely to be enacted during periods of divided government. Compare DAVID
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2. Reconciliation as Destabilizing
Another consequence of this failure to cater to the median voter is fast-
track’s tendency to destabilize tax policies.153  The current debate over the
repeal of health care illustrates the contestability of legislation enacted
through the reconciliation process, as do the Bush tax cuts, the repeal of
which has been threatened since their enactment.  Some would contend that
tax legislation must adapt to changing economic conditions, and this is cer-
tainly true.  Less durable tax legislation is not always a problem.  Yet to the
extent that the legislature is simply shifting tax policy in accordance with
ideology rather than fluctuations in economic conditions, less durable legis-
lation may harm the fiscal health of the nation by failing to secure efficient
levels of investment and other activity.154  This is especially true in the con-
text of fundamental tax reform, the pillars of which should be long-lasting to
be effective.  Less durable legislation may also produce serious social costs in
the form of rent-seeking.155
For these reasons, “[s]tability is a key goal of tax reformers.”156
Although some contemporary legal thinking often fetishizes legislative flexi-
bility, it does not fully account for its costs.157  As decision-makers delay deci-
sions in order to obtain information, the costs of obtaining that information
may increase due to decreasing resources that can be allocated to decision-
R. MAYHEW, DIVIDED WE GOVERN 7 (2d ed. 2005) (concluding that unified government
does not produce more landmark legislation than divided government), with BINDER, supra
note 1, at 71–75, 86–87 (challenging some of Mayhew’s findings).  A reasonable hypothesis
might be that legislation that shifts costs to future generations requires less bilateral sup-
port than legislation, like responsible tax reform, that imposes costs on members of the
present constituency. See Yin, supra note 137, at 1033; see also BRUCE R. BARTLETT,
IMPOSTER: HOW GEORGE W. BUSH BANKRUPTED AMERICA AND BETRAYED THE REAGAN LEGACY
134 (2006) (noting correlation between rises in spending and unified government). But
see DANIEL SHAVIRO, DO DEFICIT$ MATTER? 298–99 (1997) (contending that a divided gov-
ernment may not lead to deficit reduction since each party will engage in a game of
chicken, leaving the task of painful spending cuts to the other).
153 See, e.g., Barry Cushman, The Limits of the New Deal Analogy, 15 GREEN BAG 2D 139,
145–46 (2012) (discussing the role of bipartisan congressional support in the durability of
New Deal legislation, in contrast with its absence in health care reform).
154 For instance, the temporary nature of the research and development tax credit has
substantially reduced its efficacy.  Bronwyn H. Hall, R&D Tax Policy During the Eighties:
Success or Failure? 15 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 4240, 1994)
(“[T]he typical manufacturing firm has an enormous incentive to smooth the acquisition
of R&D capital and this greatly inhibits the effectiveness of temporary tax instruments.”).
155 See Seth H. Giertz & Jacob Feldman, The Costs of Tax Policy Uncertainty and the Need for
Tax Reform, 138 TAX NOTES 951, 959–960 (Feb. 25, 2013) (discussing rent-seeking costs of
short-term tax policy); Jason S. Oh, The Social Cost of Fundamental Tax Reform, 65 TAX L.
REV. (forthcoming 2013) (discussing the rent-seeking social costs of transitory tax reform).
156 Yin, supra note 137, at 1030.
157 David A. Super, Against Legislative Flexibility, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 1377, 1454–56
(2011).
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making, the need for decision-makers to relearn problems, and opportunity
costs.158
Flexibility also drives down the ultimate value of a policy if it leads to the
achievement of fewer of the intended policy goals.159  Social Security, for
instance, would fail as a retirement vehicle if its continued existence was not
assured and instead varied between generations.160  Similarly, America’s
unsustainable fiscal trajectory necessitates a long-term strategy.  As the fed-
eral deficit climbs to $1.5 trillion, any economic plan to close that gap must
prioritize revenue-raising and must span decades.  Polarizing tax legislation
enacted through fast-track is unlikely to fill that role.  Future repeal efforts
would tend to destabilize revenues and send poor signals to investors in the
American economic system.
Reconciliation, or any fast-track effort that limits the filibuster, thus leads
to an approach to the fiscal crisis that is both unlikely to produce sufficient
revenues and is likely to be challenged when congressional majorities
change.  Other more narrow aims of the tax law may benefit from a short
time horizon.  A temporary tax credit for hurricane victims, for instance, may
be effective.161  Major instability on the revenue side of any solution to the
looming budget crisis, however, jeopardizes its success.  Because of its ten-
dency to produce short-term legislation, fast-track is not the appropriate vehi-
cle for structural tax reform efforts, especially those aimed at the goal of
long-term deficit reduction.
3. The Contested Scope of Fast-Track
In the tax context, fast-track’s capacity to expand and contract along
party lines further destabilizes fast-track legislation by engendering distrust
between the parties.  As discussed above, the edges of reconciliation have
changed substantially since the new millennium.162  Republicans used it to
enact massive tax cuts.  Now Democrats have forbidden the use of reconcilia-
tion for tax cuts but used it to enact aspects of major health care reform.
Each of these procedural moves has proven controversial and has resulted in
distrust between the parties.  The tug-of-war is likely to continue and current
efforts to create an entirely new fast-track tax reform process will create fur-
ther areas of controversy.  As each party questions the legitimacy of the
other’s use of fast-track, the policies borne out of the process will also be
questioned.
158 Id.
159 Super, supra note 157, at 1454–56.
160 Kysar, Lasting Legislation, supra note 3, at 1061. R
161 Id. at 1065–67 (critiquing temporary legislation except in the case of emergency
situations); cf. Super, supra note 157, at 1455 (critiquing legislative flexibility even in the
context of emergency situations due to the pressure on resources at the time of crisis).
162 See supra notes 69–78 and accompanying discussion.
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III. THE FUTURE OF FAST-TRACK, TAX REFORM, AND THE FILIBUSTER
A. A Framework for Tax Reform
The above discussion shows how the procedural rules of fast-track and its
failure to produce immoderate policies make it an unlikely vehicle for
reform in an area as complex and contested as tax.  Yet so long as Congress
tinkers with tax policy through procedures such as the reconciliation process,
it may appease voters who expect to see some policy adjustments in light of
sky-rocketing deficits and economic turmoil.  So long as the party in govern-
ment moves the ball by passing a tax bill, voter expectations for real tax
reform will be dampened.
Fast-track increases the likelihood that some tax bill passes but decreases
the likelihood of complex tax reform.  A reconciliation tax bill might contain
deep tax cuts, for instance, but not base-broadening efforts.  Sunset provi-
sions, another aspect of some tax reconciliation bills, worsen the tendency of
the reconciliation process to stave off true tax reform.  As discussed above,
beginning in 2001, Republicans were able to push major tax cuts through an
evenly divided Senate using the reconciliation process.163  The Byrd Rule
forced the tax cuts to sunset so that they would not increase the deficit
beyond the budget window period.  In the ensuing decade, the continued
question of whether to repeal, extend, or partially extend those tax cuts took
precious legislative resources away from tax reform discussions.  Congress’s
use of temporary legislation also allowed it to continually “kick the can”
through repeated extensions.  So long as Congress has sunset provisions at its
disposal, it can put off the question of tax reform.  Meanwhile, it gets credit
for acting, albeit in an ineffectual capacity.
With the above analysis in mind, how might fast-track processes be
reformed in order to improve the quality of tax legislation?  It could be
argued that much of the limitations of the reconciliation process can be
traced to its modest origins as a fallback measure for aligning policies with
annual targets.  The difficulty with enacting tax reform through reconcilia-
tion is that it simply was not designed to enact legislation of such magnitude
and sophistication but was instead to apply to spending cuts.
It might be worth considering, then, a proposal that would recalibrate
the subject of fast-track to relatively modest, simple changes to the Internal
Revenue Code.  Resurrecting an idea from the 1980s, perhaps fast-track
should be limited to changing rates rather than the tax base.164  Automatic
rate decreases or increases might even kick in if revenue targets were not
met.165  This would make rate adjustment rather than substantive reform the
default option, preserving the ability of committees to opt-out if they wished
to pursue the latter.  Such an approach might also provide political cover to
accomplish the difficult task of raising rates.  Automatic rate adjustments,
163 See supra notes 69–71 and accompanying text.
164 See Handler, supra note 122, at 1267; McLure, supra note 9, at 87–89; Federal Bar
Ass’n, supra note 128, at 1583.
165 McLure, supra note 9, at 87.
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however, would pose implementation difficulties.  The rate changes would
have to be carefully calibrated upfront in light of the goals of the annual
budget resolution, taking into account not only revenue needs but redistribu-
tion concerns as well.
A rates-only rule for reconciliation legislation may also be overly broad
since minor substantive tax legislation can withstand the hurried process of
fast-track.  For instance, an approach to fixing the fiscal crisis and the tax
code in the medium term might involve relatively simple changes such as lim-
iting personal itemized deductions.166  Rather than an explicit bar on sub-
stantive reconciliation legislation in the tax context, perhaps it is enough to
recommend to congressional members that reconciliation is best used to
annually tweak revenues to meet the targeted level of the federal deficit or
surplus or to employ stopgap reform efforts as the first phase of larger
reform efforts.
The long-term economic picture, however, necessitates an overhaul of
the individual and corporate tax codes, which will be much more complex
than the aforementioned medium-term efforts and therefore ill-suited to
existing fast-track frameworks.  Indeed, use of reconciliation prior to such
reform may impede its achievement.  Many have observed that tax reform is
long overdue, with the last major changes enacted in 1986.  Others have
noted that tax legislation is increasingly “thin,” lacking major structural
changes and focusing on rate changes, as was the case with the Bush tax
cuts.167  A divided Congress is a culprit of stagnation in the tax area, yet fast-
track widens the division.  The reconciliation process contributes to partisan-
ship in several ways.  By strengthening the party leaders, fast-track moves
Congress away from its decentralized origins.168  Fast-track also tends to pro-
duce partisan legislation that creates discord.  Each party’s attempt to rede-
fine the scope of fast-track in the tax area sows further disharmony.
Although features of existing fast-track processes are problematic for tax
reform, procedural frameworks aimed at achieving such reform should not
be generally eschewed.  Indeed, procedural frameworks are often employed
in the budgetary context as precommitment devices so that lawmakers stay
the course of a primary goal of deficit reduction in the face of competing
desires to satisfy conflicting subordinate preferences.169  A procedural frame-
work may thus assist Congress’s commitment to revenue-raising tax reform170
166 For suggestions of what medium-term tax reform might look like, see Edward D.
Kleinbard & Joseph Rosenberg, The Better Base Case, 135 TAX NOTES 1237 (June 4, 2012).
167 Michael Doran, Tax Legislation in the Contemporary U.S. Congress (draft on file with
author).
168 See supra notes 17–18 and accompanying text.
169 See Elizabeth Garrett, A Fiscal Constitution with Supermajority Voting Rules, 40 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 471, 473–74 (1999).
170 The possibility of revenue-raising, rather than revenue-neutral, tax reform became
much more likely after Representative Boehner announced House Republicans were open
to such efforts in November 2012.  Jeanne Sahadi, Fiscal Cliff: Boehner’s Opening Gambit,
CNN MONEY (Nov. 8, 2012), http://money.cnn.com/2012/11/07/news/economy/boeh-
ner-fiscal-cliff/index.html.
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so that it does not deviate from that goal in working out the details of such
reform.  Additionally, a framework may also alleviate prisoners’ dilemmas by
coordinating action among congressional members so that an individual
member is not tempted to defect from the larger goal in fear that one of her
colleagues will do so first.171
A viable framework for tax reform must first contain agreement among
congressional and executive party leaders upon the amount of revenues such
reform will raise.  Such an agreement will most likely be formulated in the
context of an overall deficit reduction plan, which should consist of a mix of
spending cuts and tax reform.  Any set of procedures for tax reform will likely
fail if this common goal has not yet been formulated.  The achievement of
tax reform will be more likely if there is agreement among the party leaders
as to distributional goals.  A compromise position, for instance, might be to
maintain distributional neutrality, although the recent willingness of Repub-
licans to limit tax deductions suggests they might be amenable to some level
of heavier taxation on the wealthy, even if not through an increase in rates.
Once the revenue and distributional targets are in place, the question
arises as to the desired level of specification of the details of tax reform.  The
House fast-track proposal discussed above specifies, albeit in partisan terms,
the goals of tax reform, such as flattening rates.172  Although upfront agree-
ment between congressional party leaders and the President on the contours
of tax reform will make reform more likely to occur, this would remove
power from the tax-writing committees, the Joint Committee on Taxation,
and Treasury, which might result in poorly formulated tax policy.173  An
approach that would mediate between these concerns would be to identify,
through bipartisan agreement, areas of concern and opportunities for
reform within the tax code, without specifying outcomes.  This exercise
would generate guideposts within which the tax entities could work without
also eliminating their expertise.  It would also reflect the reality that the
achievement of any fine-grained detail as to the shape of tax reform would
take many months to achieve, removing one of the primary advantages that a
framework procedure offers.  Additionally, the ability to bifurcate the budget-
ary negotiations and the committee markup sessions means that secrecy
could be provided to encourage success of the former without sacrificing an
open, collaborative approach for the latter.174
The formulation of a Committee on Tax Reform to coordinate and elab-
orate the details of tax reform would also be a positive development.  Such a
171 Garrett, supra note 11, at 412.
172 See supra notes 106–11.
173 See supra notes 125–41; see also Garrett, supra note 11, at 439–40 (“[T]he tax law
could suffer if lawmakers (and staffs) with less expertise took on more responsibility for
drafting revenue laws.”).
174 It is likely that congressional leaders will prefer a closed approach to budget negoti-
ations while committee leaders will desire a transparent discussion in shaping the bill. See
James C. Gould, Not Your Father’s Tax Reform: 2013 v. 1986, 137 TAX NOTES 1097, 1099–100
(Dec. 3, 2012).
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committee might consist of tax policy experts from the Joint Committee on
Taxation, Treasury, academic institutions and think tanks, former congres-
sional members, business and public interest representatives, and members
of the tax-writing committees.  The Committee on Tax Reform might be fur-
ther subdivided into areas of expertise, such as corporate tax, international
tax, and individual tax expenditures.  A two-stage process could be employed,
such that the Committee produces a discussion draft bill, which could then
be modified by the Ways and Means Committee before being reported to the
House.175
The failure of the “supercommittee” in resolving the budget crisis does
not doom such an approach.  One difficulty with the task set out for the
supercommittee was its vastness.176  By focusing on tax reform alone, the task
becomes more feasible.  Additionally, the supercommittee lacked allocation
among spending, tax rates, and tax reforms to achieve the deficit reduction
goal of $1.5 trillion and did not have a strong enough mandate to make such
an allocation.  This shortcoming could be overcome by having party leaders
and the President decide upon such an allocation upfront, as discussed
above.
As mentioned above, the truncated timelines of existing fast-track
processes do not lend themselves to complex changes in the law and instead
were designed to effectuate simple modifications to spending.  Any frame-
work for tax reform should instead look to history in setting a feasible time-
line that reflects the pressures of reality without wasting valuable momentum
or stretching across multiple Congresses.  A one to two-year time horizon
would likely meet these goals.  Furthermore, if the framework utilizes a multi-
stage approach, it would be beneficial to specify the time horizon for each
stage.
Thus, to provide an example assuming a two-year time frame, a deadline
for the discussion draft to be reported out of the Committee on Tax Reform
might occur at the one-year mark.  Ways and Means might have another
three months before having to report the bill to the House.  Any framework
for tax reform should also set forth procedures to govern once the bill is
reported out of the Ways and Means Committee.  Because sufficient time has
175 This compromise approach would ensure compliance with the Origination Clause
and would stave off accusations from the tax-writing committee that the process curtailed
its jurisdiction. See ALLEN SCHICK, CONGRESS AND MONEY 78 (1980) (“In Congress, as in
other institutions, it is very difficult to reform by taking power away from those who hold it.
If provoked by over-reaching change, powerful interests can block not only intrusions on
their own position but overall reform as well.  The surer way to institute change, therefore,
is to accept existing arrangements and not try to divest powerholders of their special advan-
tages.”).  This phenomenon also motivates the inclusion of members of the tax-writing
committees in the proposed Committee on Tax Reform.
176 Peter Diamond, Op-Ed., Down with Supercommittees, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2012, at
A27, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/20/opinion/down-with-supercommit-
tees.html?_r=0 (discussing the supercommittee’s task of addressing “a vast overhaul of the
federal budget, a range so wide there was no hope of sufficiently addressing government
inefficiencies”).
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been devoted in formulating the tax reform bill, expedited consideration, as
is seen in existing fast-track frameworks, is not as problematic.  Additionally,
if party leaders and the executive have achieved broad bipartisan agreement
over the revenue and distributional effects of tax reform, the concerns out-
lined above regarding majority voting largely fall away.177  Thus, a framework
for tax reform might limit debate in the House to forty hours and require the
House to consider such legislation within thirty days of being placed on the
calendar.  After the bill is received in the Senate, the Senate Committee on
Finance then could have two months to report the bill out of Committee.
Instead of resorting completely to majority voting in the Senate, the frame-
work might foreclose cloture votes upon amendments and motions to pro-
ceed while preserving a cloture vote on the final consideration of the bill.178
The framework for tax reform could also provide for expedited conference
proceedings, if necessary, in order to achieve passage by both houses and
signature by the President before the end of the designated two-year period.
This proposed framework aims to draw upon existing processes without
also importing those features that are harmful to the achievement of tax
reform.  Its success is predicated upon initial agreement among congres-
sional leaders and the President as to the revenue and distributional impacts
of tax reform.  Although such a goal is challenging, its ability to avoid vague,
nonbinding aspirations without also necessitating enumeration of the partic-
ularities of reform makes it achievable.  Guided by this broad agreement, the
framework may thus avoid pitfalls of prior procedural solutions.
B. Implications for the Filibuster
The evolution of reconciliation also provides valuable insight into the
current state of the filibuster.  In the latter quarter of the twenty-first century,
most contemporary acts receive three-fifths of senatorial support, the num-
ber necessary to invoke cloture.179  Moreover, the incidence of filibustering
has dramatically increased in the last several decades.180  Yet, the filibuster, a
once unwavering hallmark in the Senate, has never been more tenuous than
today, perhaps due to its constant invocation.  Consistent threats of a
“nuclear” or “constitutional” option lay bare that the filibuster can likely be
eliminated by a simple majority vote of the Senate.181  The fragility of the
filibuster is thus well known.
177 See supra notes 141–45 and accompanying text.
178 These features are similar to those in the recently passed House proposal to provide
for expedited consideration of a tax reform bill. See supra notes 95–104 and accompanying
text.
179 See GREGORY J. WAWRO & ERIC SCHICKLER, FILIBUSTER 28 (2006) (finding that,
between 1975 and 1994, approximately 95% of major legislation not subject to limited
debated passed with at least a three-fifths voting majority).
180 Sarah A. Binder & Thomas E. Mann, Slaying the Dinosaur: The Case for Reforming the
Senate Filibuster, 13 BROOKINGS REV. 42, 42–45 (1995) (using the number of cloture votes to
document a dramatic increase in filibustering since the 1950s).
181 See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\88-5\NDL504.txt unknown Seq: 34 17-JUL-13 10:52
2154 notre dame law review [vol. 88:5
In the context of tax legislation, however, the filibuster has suffered a
perhaps fatal blow.  The high political costs of eliminating the filibuster out-
right have led the Senate to seek other ways to diminish minority rights.  By
functioning as an escape valve from strict supermajority requirements, the
reconciliation process has perhaps given the filibuster the flexibility neces-
sary to its survival.  Paradoxically, getting rid of this safety valve could lead to
the filibuster’s demise.
The increasing expansion of the reconciliation process thus underscores
the precariousness of strict supermajority rule but also its persistence (in an
albeit weakened form).  Which dynamic will prevail remains to be seen.  In
the past decade, vast amounts of legislation, including massive health care
reform and several of our nation’s largest tax cuts, have passed through the
reconciliation process without supermajority support.  Reconciliation’s appli-
cation will extend to wider contexts in the coming years, as procedural mav-
ericks exploit its power to move legislation quickly without the crippling
need to maintain supermajority support.  Nonetheless, drafters’ careful,
almost artful, conformity to the highly specific and arcane requirements of
the fast-track process indicate that supermajority norms are still very much
alive in the Senate.
Still, the optionality of the filibuster in the tax context presents a new
dimension to the debate over the filibuster’s constitutionality and wisdom.
Obscure yet paramount developments in the reconciliation process mean
that a simple majority can now invoke or eliminate the filibuster in the con-
text of tax increases and decreases, in accordance with party preferences.
One of the justifications for the current Senate supermajority rules, and
indeed for procedural rules in general, is the “veil of ignorance” behind
which they stand—winners now may later be losers.  With that knowledge, it
is thought that the legislature will create fair and just rules.182
In the context of the filibuster, its threat to future, unknown minorities
causes known majorities to abide by it.  In contrast, the perception of games-
manship over the contested boundaries of the reconciliation process sows
distrust among congressional members.  This dynamic destabilizes those poli-
cies pushed through fast-track in an aggressive manner and also creates bad
blood that makes future bipartisan efforts less likely.  In so doing, it may also
ultimately cause the precariousness of strict supermajority rule to trump its
persistence, thus leading to the demise of the filibuster.183  More broadly, it
182 See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 12, 136–42 (1971); Adrian Vermeule, Veil of
Ignorance Rules in Constitutional Law, 111 YALE L.J. 399, 400 (2001) (arguing that the Fed-
eral Constitution contains a number of rules that may be analyzed as veil rules, such as the
Ex Post Facto and Bill of Attainder Clauses, among others).
183 I do not take a position here as to whether this is a positive development.  Propo-
nents of the filibuster support its deliberative effects and ability to protect the minority
whereas opponents would attack it as a source of congressional gridlock.  I will note, how-
ever, that recent empirical evidence does not strongly support the latter proposition. See
BINDER, supra note 1, at 82 (“The severity of the filibuster threat showed little effect on the R
frequency of deadlock once bicameral differences and party polarization and control were
taken into account.”).
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may destabilize Senate rules.  Although some may ultimately welcome eradi-
cation of the filibuster, in order to avoid unfavorable consequences for the
Senate as an institution, filibuster reform should occur through transparent,
bipartisan efforts, rather than the backdoor, piecemeal approach through
reconciliation currently being pursued by simple majorities.
CONCLUSION
To return to the subject of this symposium, we must ask whether we
would face less stalemate over tax policy with fast-track as an option than
without it.  The fast-track process, due to features antithetical to tax reform,
will tend to produce shallow tax legislation instead of deep reform, but per-
haps such legislation is better than none at all.  Reliance on an increasingly
flexible reconciliation process, however, has contributed to a legislative envi-
ronment hostile to tax reform.  Although fast-track may produce more
churning of the Tax Code, it does not move our tax policy forward to meet
the grave challenges of the twenty-first century and indeed impedes our abil-
ity to do so.
Yet the forecast for tax reform need not be dire.  The unfathomable
growth of the deficit necessitates raising substantial revenue.  The growing
consensus among economists and other tax experts is that this will require
significant alteration to, or broadening of, the tax base.  Although reconcilia-
tion may have contributed to the stymied growth of our tax system for the
past three decades, the exigency of tax reform may prevent Congress from
continuing to kick the can.  In order to accomplish lasting tax reform that
also addresses structural problems in the current tax system, however, con-
gressional members will likely have to develop new procedural frameworks.  I
have suggested what such processes might look like, and the ways in which
they depart from existing fast-track processes or proposals.
Turning to the legislative process in general, the parameters of reconcili-
ation have proven so controversial as to contribute to the general destabiliza-
tion of Senate supermajority rules.  The ability of a simple majority to
essentially curb or invoke the filibuster through the budget resolution has
created Senate rules that no longer seem to operate behind a veil of igno-
rance.  Separate and apart from one’s normative view of the filibuster, this
dynamic threatens the legitimacy of Senate practices.  It is unlikely that rec-
onciliation will again be relegated to the sidelines as its drafters originally
intended, yet true filibuster reform should come from coordinated agree-
ment across party lines in order to avoid inflicting damage upon the institu-
tion and further charging an already partisan atmosphere.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\88-5\NDL504.txt unknown Seq: 36 17-JUL-13 10:52
2156 notre dame law review [vol. 88:5
